Lessons of Operation Car Wash: A legal, institutional, and economic analysis (cap. 2, Costa, Lima e Goldschmidt)

Chapter 2 of the Wilson Center book (2020) describes that the task force concluded that two Petrobras directors and the PT treasurer agreed on bribes equivalent to 0.9% of the contracts brokered by Sete Brasil, with prices 11% to 24% above similar bids, and that Sete Brasil officially acknowledged bribes of US$224 million; the budget for the rigs was estimated at between US$22 and US$25 billion.

Source: Lessons of Operation Car Wash: A legal, institutional, and economic analysis (cap. 2, Costa, Lima e Goldschmidt) — Brazil Institute, Wilson Center (eds. Fabio Ramazzini Bechara and Paulo C. Goldschmidt; hosted by FGV Direito SP), Nov. 2020 · Ch. 2, section on Sete Brasil, pp. 42–43 · open original ↗

Study (primary) · excerpt examined · accessed on Oct. 24, 2026

Limitations: The authors describe the task force's conclusion (an MPF accusation) and Sete Brasil's own admission; it is not a court decision. The authors favor the thesis that corruption caused the losses.

The same chapter states that corruption at Petrobras and its suppliers, aggravated by the fall in oil prices in 2015, led Sete Brasil to file for judicial reorganization at the end of April 2016, with debt estimated at about US$5 billion, two-thirds owed to the federal government through public banks and funds (Banco do Brasil US$1 billion; Shipbuilding Guarantee Fund US$1.3 billion; FI-FGTS US$0.7 billion; Caixa US$0.5 billion); in April 2016, the degree of completion of the contracts ranged from 4.78% to 89.96% per rig (Table 7).

Source: Lessons of Operation Car Wash: A legal, institutional, and economic analysis (cap. 2, Costa, Lima e Goldschmidt) — Brazil Institute, Wilson Center (eds. Fabio Ramazzini Bechara and Paulo C. Goldschmidt; hosted by FGV Direito SP), Nov. 2020 · Ch. 2, pp. 42–44 (Table 7) · open original ↗

Study (primary) · excerpt examined · accessed on Oct. 24, 2026

Limitations: Dollar amounts estimated by the authors, with no primary source cited in the passage read. Compare with the debts in reais cited by news reports (R$17.4 billion in 2019, R$36 billion in 2024).

The same chapter records, citing Sinaval, that direct jobs in the shipbuilding industry, above 82,000 in 2014, fell to about 50,000 in the first quarter of 2016, and attributes a devastating effect on the sector to the interruption of the Sete Brasil contracts.

Source: Lessons of Operation Car Wash: A legal, institutional, and economic analysis (cap. 2, Costa, Lima e Goldschmidt) — Brazil Institute, Wilson Center (eds. Fabio Ramazzini Bechara and Paulo C. Goldschmidt; hosted by FGV Direito SP), Nov. 2020 · Ch. 2, p. 43 · open original ↗

Study (primary) · excerpt examined · accessed on Oct. 24, 2026

Limitations: The figure of 50,000 does not match the Sinaval series reproduced by Brasil de Fato (57,048 in 2015 and 43,745 in June 2016); different base date.

The authors of chapter 2 write that without asset write-downs (impairments) Petrobras would not have posted a negative result between 2014 and 2018, that the reasons the company stated for the write-downs in the E&P area (fall in oil prices, exchange rate, discount rate, idle rigs, uncertainties in ship construction, decommissioning of platforms) are adequate, and that it will never be known how much of the write-downs is attributable to corruption, to poor management decisions, or to market conditions.

Source: Lessons of Operation Car Wash: A legal, institutional, and economic analysis (cap. 2, Costa, Lima e Goldschmidt) — Brazil Institute, Wilson Center (eds. Fabio Ramazzini Bechara and Paulo C. Goldschmidt; hosted by FGV Direito SP), Nov. 2020 · Ch. 2, p. 44 and concluding section on Petrobras's results · open original ↗

Study (primary) · excerpt examined · accessed on Oct. 24, 2026

Limitations: Paraphrase of the passage in English ('we will never know how much of the impairments could be attributable...'); useful as a statement of the limit of identification by authors favorable to the operation.