Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF)

The civil construction part comes from a survey, on the MPF and TCU websites, of works halted as a result of Lava Jato actions and works in which the companies declared financial inability to continue.

Source: Implicações econômicas intersetoriais da Operação Lava Jato — DIEESE, Mar. 16, 2021 · slide 6, side text · open original ↗

Ferraz, Moura, Norden, and Schechtman (NBER, July 2025), using a difference-in-differences design with data from RAIS and the Central Bank's credit registry, estimated that the 21 investigated construction companies saw a 63% drop in wage bill and a 54% drop in employment after the investigations began, compared with control firms with more than 250 employees; the volume of new loans to them fell 50%.

Source: The Real Costs of Washing Away Corruption: Evidence from Brazil's Lava Jato Investigation — NBER (Working Paper 33991), July 2025 · Introduction, pp. 1–2; Table 2 and Figure 3 · open original ↗

On February 1, 2024, STF Justice Dias Toffoli suspended payment of the fines under the leniency agreement signed in 2016 by Odebrecht (now Novonor) with the MPF (R$8.5 billion, according to the article) and authorized the company to renegotiate the terms with the PGR, CGU, and AGU, citing reasonable doubt as to the company's voluntariness in signing; Novonor had alleged serious financial difficulties in meeting the obligations and excesses by the task force revealed by Operation Spoofing.

Source: Toffoli suspende multas de R$ 8,5 bilhões da Novonor em acordo da Lava Jato — InfoMoney, Feb. 1, 2024 · News report of February 1, 2024 · open original ↗

MPF tally released in January 2015: those investigated diverted R$2.1 billion from Petrobras, in overpriced RNEST contracts (2009–2014); R$450 million recovered and R$200 million in assets frozen; 12 plea agreements; 150 individuals and 232 companies investigated.

Source: Desvios na Petrobras chegaram a R$ 2,1 bilhões, estima MPF — Agência Brasil, Jan. 29, 2015 · body of the report (Agência Brasil, January 29, 2015) · open original ↗

In the 7th phase of Lava Jato (November 14, in the year the operation began), the freezing of about R$720 million in assets of 36 people under investigation was ordered.

Source: Lava Jato na PRR4 — Linha do Tempo MPF — Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (PRR4), 2026 · timeline text, passage on the 7th phase ("Final Judgment") · open original ↗

Tally of the Curitiba task force (October 2019): R$14.3 billion provided for in leniency agreements, cooperation agreements, TACs, and waivers; R$4,069,514,758.69 returned, an amount that includes R$570 million allocated to reduce tolls in Paraná (R$220 million Ecorodovias and R$350 million Rodonorte), R$3,023,990,764.92 to Petrobras, R$416,523,412.77 to the Union, and R$59 million to the 11th Court of Goiás (the sum of the components differs from the total by R$581); claim for reimbursement of R$18.3 billion in 10 improbity actions.

Source: Lava Jato já devolveu R$ 4 bi e impôs penas que somam 2.249 anos de prisão — Jornal de Brasília (Estadão Conteúdo), Dec. 2, 2019 · body of the report (Estadão Conteúdo, December 2, 2019) · open original ↗

Gazeta do Povo (May 11, 2021): 278 cooperation and leniency agreements provide for returning R$22 billion (payment over up to 20 years); Curitiba reportedly has R$12.7 billion in leniency fines, R$2.1 billion in compensatory cooperation fines, and R$111.5 million in waivers; Rio: R$945 million (cooperation) and R$145 million (leniency) already returned; more than R$5 billion returned to the public coffers.

Source: Lava Jato: quanto dinheiro foi recuperado e para onde foi — Gazeta do Povo, May 11, 2021 · body of the report · open original ↗

The 2018 leniency agreement with the CGU/AGU (R$2.7 billion) was designed to be deducted from the total of R$3.8 billion already agreed with the MPF-PR; according to the report, the CGU/AGU amount "will be deducted" from what was agreed with the MPF.

Source: Odebrecht assina leniência com governo e pagará R$ 2,7 bilhões — Consultor Jurídico, July 9, 2018 · body of the report, July 9, 2018 · open original ↗

DOJ (September 27, 2018): Petrobras agreed to pay US$853.2 million, under a non-prosecution agreement, to resolve an FCPA investigation; the United States will credit amounts paid to the SEC and to Brazil, with the DOJ and SEC each receiving 10% (US$85.32 million each) and Brazil 80% (US$682.56 million). A 25% discount off the bottom of the sentencing guidelines range was applied.

Source: Petrobras Agrees to Pay More Than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (comunicado do Departamento de Justiça dos EUA) — U.S. Department of Justice, Sept. 27, 2018 · pages 1–2 of the statement · open original ↗

MPF (via Correio Braziliense, February 3, 2021): at the end of the Curitiba task force, the tally records 79 phases, 533 defendants, and R$4.3 billion recovered.

Source: Força-tarefa da Lava-Jato em Curitiba "deixa de existir", informa MPF — Correio Braziliense, Feb. 3, 2021 · body of the report · open original ↗

The PGR appealed, asking the Plenary to recognize the jurisdiction of the 13th Court and preserve its procedural and decision-making acts; Lula's defense asked that the dismissal of related cases occur only after the decision became final, except for HC 164.493.

Source: Marcado para 14/4 julgamento de recursos da decisão que anulou condenações de Lula — Supreme Federal Court, Mar. 25, 2021 · body of the news item · open original ↗

On December 7, 2021, the MPF asked for the triplex case against Lula, Léo Pinheiro and Paulo Okamotto to be closed, due to the statute of limitations (term halved for people over 70) and because there was no basis to file or ratify the indictment after the evidence was annulled.

Source: MPF pede arquivamento de caso do tríplex contra Lula — Poder360, Dec. 7, 2021 · body of the article · open original ↗

The Prosecutor General of the Republic gave an opinion that the complaint should be dismissed in full, finding that, even if the lifting of secrecy at first instance had been improper, this would not amount to usurpation of the STF's jurisdiction.

Source: Reclamação 23.457/PR — decisão do Min. Teori Zavascki (13/06/2016) — Supreme Federal Court, June 13, 2016 · p. 4 · open original ↗

The MPF stated, according to the report, that the expenses were authorized by Ordinance 41/2014, and Dallagnol and Janot said they would appeal.

Source: TCU multa Dallagnol e Janot por diárias na Lava Jato — Poder360, Aug. 9, 2022 · body of the article · open original ↗

On March 15, 2019, in ADPF 568 (filed by the PGR; related cases ADPF 569, by PT and PDT, and Rcl 33.667, by the Chamber of Deputies), Alexandre de Moraes suspended the effects of the Agreement on the Assumption of Obligations between Petrobras and prosecutors of the MPF-PR and of the 13th Court decision that approved it, and froze the deposited amounts (US$682.5 million transferred by Petrobras to 'Brazilian authorities' under an agreement with the DOJ), citing the risk of diversion of public money and doubt about the creation of a private foundation to manage them.

Source: Ministro suspende eficácia de acordo firmado entre procuradores da República no Paraná e Petrobras — Supreme Federal Court, Mar. 15, 2019 · body of the news item · open original ↗

The PGR (Raquel Dodge) argued that the first-instance MPF has no powers to manage the funds and that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to approve the agreement; the task force said it had already requested suspension of the fund before the PGR's request.

Source: Ministro do Supremo suspende acordo da Lava Jato com os EUA — Agência Brasil, Mar. 15, 2019 · body of the article · open original ↗

According to Agência Brasil (2019), the fine of about R$2 billion provided that part of it would go to a social-interest foundation to be created by the task force.

Source: Ministro do Supremo suspende acordo da Lava Jato com os EUA — Agência Brasil, Mar. 15, 2019 · body of the article · open original ↗

Dallagnol left the MPF in November 2021 (Poder360 dates his departure to November 2, 2021 and the 2026 TSE counts the ineligibility period from November 3, 2021), when he was facing proceedings at the CNMP and had already been sanctioned with a warning and a censure.

Source: Entenda a controvérsia sobre a decisão do TSE que cassou Dallagnol — Poder360, June 6, 2023 · context section · open original ↗

Deltan Dallagnol resigned from his post as federal prosecutor in November 2021; Poder360 described the farewell video as "in a candidate's tone".

Source: Deltan Dallagnol, ex-coordenador da Lava Jato, deixa o MPF — Poder360, Nov. 4, 2021 · Opening of the article · open original ↗

In May 2023, the TSE revoked the federal deputy mandate of Deltan Dallagnol, elected for Podemos in 2022, finding that he asked to resign from the MPF with disciplinary proceedings pending; Dallagnol maintained in the October 14, 2023 interview that the decision denied his registration but did not make him ineligible.

Source: TSE suspende candidatura e Deltan Dallagnol está inelegível — Brasil de Fato, Oct. 3, 2026 · "What happened?" section · open original ↗

On July 15, 2025, Dias Toffoli annulled all Lava Jato acts against Youssef, including Moro's decisions, citing 'collusion' among the PF, the MPF and Moro; he stated that the decision does not invalidate the plea agreement. Youssef's defense maintains that a clandestine recording in a PF cell in 2014, which allegedly lasted 11 days, was used to pressure him into signing the plea agreement.

Source: Toffoli anula todos os atos da Lava Jato contra Alberto Youssef — CNN Brasil, July 15, 2025 · body of the article · open original ↗

Costa was arrested by the PF in March 2014 (day not confirmed); began testifying to the PF on September 5, 2014 and entered into a cooperation agreement; he was sentenced to 12 years in a closed regime for money laundering with Youssef and Camargo Corrêa executives (report of July 20, 2015), initially serving at home and, since October 2016, in a semi-open regime; in February 2017 the MPF asked Moro to suspend his benefits on the argument that he had lied in the cooperation.

Source: Paulo Roberto Costa (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · text and references · open original ↗

Deltan Dallagnol was a federal prosecutor from January 30, 2003 to November 3, 2021 (he asked to resign; published on November 5, 2021) and coordinated the Lava Jato task force in Curitiba (period not dated in the excerpt); he was elected federal deputy for Paraná (Podemos) on October 2, 2022, had his registration revoked by the TSE on May 16, 2023 (confirmed by the Chamber's Board on June 6, 2023) and joined Novo in 2023.

Source: Deltan Dallagnol (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · sections Offices and TSE · open original ↗

Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima became a federal prosecutor in 1995, was a regional federal prosecutor (3rd Region, SP), worked on the Lava Jato task force in Curitiba until September 2018 and retired (retirement announced in March 2019, according to a Conjur reference).

Source: Carlos Fernando dos Santos Lima (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · section Offices · open original ↗

Januário Paludo is a federal prosecutor and was part of the Lava Jato task force in Curitiba (dates not given; the entry contradicts itself on whether he is a current or former member); he coordinated a decentralized unit of the internal affairs office at the PRR4. In November 2021, the TCU ordered five prosecutors, including Paludo, to return R$2.5 million in per diems and airfare.

Source: Januário Paludo (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · text · open original ↗

Rodrigo Janot was a federal prosecutor (1984–2019), deputy prosecutor general (2003), secretary-general of the MPF (2003–2005) and Prosecutor General of the Republic from September 17, 2013 to September 17, 2017 (nominated by Dilma Rousseff, reappointed in 2015); he retired in April 2019 and opened a law firm in June 2019.

Source: Rodrigo Janot (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · section Offices · open original ↗

Augusto Aras joined the MPF in 1987, was deputy prosecutor general of the Republic (2011) and Prosecutor General of the Republic from September 26, 2019 to September 26, 2023, nominated by Jair Bolsonaro on September 5, 2019 (outside the triple list) and approved by the Senate by 68 to 10 on September 25, 2019; reappointed on August 24, 2021 (55 votes in favor).

Source: Augusto Aras (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · section Offices · open original ↗

The MPF is one of the branches of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Union; the Prosecutor General of the Republic heads it and is its only representative at the STF.

Source: Ministério Público Federal (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · lead · open original ↗

According to the Lava Jato entry, in December 2015 the MPF Superior Council established a second task force, at the STJ; the entry indicates the operation ended on February 1, 2021. MPF data (Dec. 2019) show 159 convicted and R$4 billion returned at first instance in Curitiba (tally attributed to the MPF; do not add to other numbers).

Source: Operação Lava Jato (verbete da Wikipédia em português) — Portuguese-language Wikipedia, Oct. 24, 2026 · sections 2014 and tally · open original ↗